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Abstract 
Landy and Goodwin’s (2015) meta-analysis found 
support for most of the experimental findings we 
reported in Schnall, Haidt, Clore, and Jordan (2008), 
including a robust amplification effect of olfactory 
disgust on moral judgment even in the absence of 
important moderator variables. Had they considered 
those known moderators and attended to known 
attributional issues, they might have confirmed all of 
our findings. 
 
 
 
With failed replications on various topics getting 
published these days, we were pleased that Landy and 
Goodwin’s (2015) meta-analysis supported most of the 
findings we reported in Schnall, Haidt, Clore, and 
Jordan (2008). They focused on what Pizarro, Inbar 
and Helion (2011) had termed the amplification 
hypothesis of Haidt’s (2001) social intuitionist model 
of moral judgment, namely that “disgust amplifies 
moral evaluations—it makes wrong things seem even 
more wrong (Pizarro et al., 2011, p. 267, emphasis in 
original).” Like us, Landy and Goodwin (2015) found 
that the overall effect of incidental disgust on moral 
judgment is usually small or zero when ignoring 
relevant moderator variables. Like us, they found that 
there appears to be something special about olfactory 
inductions – they often work even without requiring 
moderators. And like us, they found that the effects of 
incidental disgust are as strong for non-purity 
violations (such as falsifying a resume) as for purity 
violations (such as eating a dead dog).  
So you can imagine our puzzlement when Landy 
and Goodwin (2015) interpreted their findings as 
evidence against our experimental findings (Schnall et 
al., 2008) and more generally, against social 
intuitionism (Haidt, 2001). The puzzle resolves itself 
when we examine three factors that we believe they 
did not properly consider.  
First, the meta-analyses failed to include 
personality variables that have been shown to be 
crucial for the effect. In our 3 experiments that did not 
involve smell, the amplification effect of incidental 
physical disgust on moral judgments occurred only for 
participants who were generally sensitive to bodily 
sensations, as measured by the Private Body 
Consciousness scale (Miller, Murphy, & Buss, 1981). 
Landy and Goodwin did not include this established 
moderator variable in their analyses, nor any of the 
additional individual difference moderators that have 
been documented since then, such as attentional 
control (Van Dillen, van der Waal, van den Bos, 
2012), emotional differentiation (Cameron, Payne, & 
Doris, 2013) and mindfulness (Sato & Sugiura, 2014). 
Their failure to find an overall effect in non-olfactory 
studies replicates the pattern we reported. Their 
reasoning that the relevant analyses were “not 
feasible” since only some experiments had included 
these moderators raises the fundamental question of 
why a meta-analysis was conducted on data for which 
essential variables had not even been assessed. 
Second, Landy and Goodwin (2015) minimized the 
importance of one of their own major findings – that 
for studies that used taste or smell to induce disgust, 
there was a clear and robust effect even without 
considering moderator variables. The special potency 
of taste and smell may be due to their direct activation 
of the anterior insula, which is one of the major brain 
regions consistently implicated in research on visceral 
effects on cognition (Damasio, 2003). Given that this 
whole line of research is about incidental disgust, not 
disgust that is directly elicited by a moral infraction, 
their confirmation that bad tastes and smells can 
amplify moral condemnation of unrelated actions is 
very clear evidence of the mechanism we previously 
described. After all, our goal was to demonstrate the 
existence of these links, which are inconsistent with a 
rationalist account of moral judgment, but are 
predicted by the social intuitionist model (Haidt, 
2001), and by the affect-as-information framework 
(Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Schwarz, 2012).  
Third, experiments investigating the influence of 
emotional states on judgment require that participants 
do not correctly attribute the induced feeling to its true 
source (e.g., Lapate, Rokers, Li, & Davidson, 2014; 
Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Schnall, Abrahamson, & 
Laird, 2002; for a review, see Schwarz, 2012). If one 
experiences disgust while considering a morally 
questionable action, the action is likely to seem 
disgusting and immoral (at least, for people who are 
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more attentive to bodily states). But if disgust becomes 
an object of focus before the morally questionable act 
is considered, then interpreting the affect as a response 
to the act becomes unlikely. Instead, induced disgust 
will either have no effect or the opposite effect. The 
disgust can reduce the severity of the moral judgment 
when participants’ correct attributions to an extraneous 
source make irrelevant not only the induced disgust, 
but also any negative affect one experiences while 
considering morally ambiguous behavior. 
Unfortunately, in misguided attempts to increase 
rigor, investigators sometimes include pre-measures of 
mood, or otherwise call attention to participants’ 
feelings before collecting the dependent measures. For 
example, one recently published failure of mood 
effects included mood assessments before both the 
mood induction and the dependent measure (Van 
Damme & Seynaeve, 2013). Another included seven 
mood assessments spread throughout the procedure 
(Bruyneel, van Steenbergen, Hommel, Band, De 
Raedt, & Koster, 2013). Studies with similar 
methodological issues (e.g., Ong et al., 2014) made 
their way into the current meta-analysis. Because 
Landy and Goodwin (2015) did not consider the 
quality of the selected studies in this regard—and for 
unpublished work, relevant methodological details are 
not reported—the resulting effect size estimates are 
highly unreliable.  
In closing, we thank Landy and Goodwin (2015) 
for pulling together the rapidly growing literature on 
incidental disgust and moral judgment. Their findings 
increase our confidence that olfactory disgust has a 
robust effect on moral judgments, that the effect of 
incidental disgust induced through other sensory 
modalities hinges largely on established moderator 
variables, and that incidental disgust exaggerates the 
severity of judgments of purity and non-purity 
violations alike (Schnall et al., 2008). Their findings 
also support the conclusion drawn by Chapman and 
Anderson (2013), who provided a comprehensive 
review of research on the role of disgust and morality 
using a wide range of methods – far beyond the 
incidental disgust technique. We concur with their 
summary of the state of the art: “Taken together, these 
studies converge to support the notion that disgust does 
play an important role in morality. We suggest that the 
time is now right to address more specific questions 
regarding the nature and role of disgust in moral 
cognition.” (p. 322).  
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